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Abstract—Recent NASA concepts for human missions to Mars, 
including the Evolvable Mars Campaign and Design Reference 
Architecture 5.0, have focused on the conduct of missions with 
long duration stays on the Martian surface. The decision to 
focus on long duration missions (typically to a single site) is 
driven by a desire to increase the perceived sustainability of 
the human Mars campaign, predicated on the assumption that 
sustainability is best achieved by maximizing the level of 
activity on the surface, providing for continuous growth in 
operations, and promoting pioneering of Mars.  
However, executing a series of long duration missions to a 
single site is not the only option for human exploration of Mars 
that has been proposed. Other architectures have been 
evaluated that focus on missions with short duration surface 
stays, with each mission visiting a separate site on the surface. 
This type of architecture is less efficient in that elements are 
not typically reused from one mission to the next but requires a 
far less complex surface architecture.   
There are potentially valid arguments to be made that a 
short duration, multiple site approach could result in different 
types of advantages when compared to the long duration, 
single site approach to Mars exploration, particularly for 
initial human missions to Mars. These arguments revolve 
around four areas: Achieved Value, Risk Mitigation, 
Developmental Affordability, and Operational Affordability & 
Flexibility. 
The question of Achieved Value relates to the 
prioritization of goals for Martian exploration. As discussed, 
goals related to pioneering and expanding human presence are 
often referenced as justifications for the long duration 
approach. However, there are other competing goals, including 
science and exploration. While there is not a clear consensus 
among planetary scientists, many have argued that the value of 
being able to visit multiple sites could outweigh the value of 
continually visiting a single site.  
Risk Mitigation is a major concern for initial human 
missions to Mars. There are a number of hazards related to 
operating on the Martian surface that are not well 
characterized. It may be desirable to conduct a series of short 
duration missions to better understand the nature of these 
risks prior to committing to a long duration mission.  
Developmental Affordability relates to the ability of 
NASA and its partners to develop and deploy the proposed 
architecture. Any human missions to Mars will be among the 
most complex endeavors ever undertaken. The capabilities that 
must be developed to enable any human Mars missions are 
extremely challenging. The total design, development, test, and 
evaluation (DDT&E) budget required to develop just the 
essential capabilities alone will be substantial. If additional 
surface capabilities are required to support long duration 
surface stays, the development effort could be unaffordable.  
Operational Affordability & Flexibility relates to the 
continued costs to execute the Mars campaign. Long duration 
missions, even with some amount of in-situ resource utilization, 
require a significant level of resupply for every mission. This 
requires additional launches and in-space transportation 
assets, increasing the operational complexity and total 
operational cost.  
This paper will explore each of the four potential 
advantages of short duration missions in detail. The authors 
will present comparisons between proposed long duration and 
short duration architectures through an evaluation of relevant 
performance, cost, and risk metrics. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Apollo lunar landings are widely considered to be one 
of NASA’s and humankind’s greatest technological 
achievements. However, during the first lunar landing, Neil 
Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin spent only 22 hours on the 
lunar surface. The longest duration on the surface for any 
Apollo mission was 75 hours - just over three days. While 
early Apollo planning included concepts for extended 
exploration, such as long duration stays, habitats, and 
pressurized rovers [1], budgetary and political realities 
ultimately limited the program to only short duration sortie-
type missions. While the Apollo program achieved its stated 
objectives, many space enthusiasts and historians lament the 
fact that the extended concepts were never realized and that 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20200002543 2020-05-24T04:50:07+00:00Z
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the lunar program was terminated after Apollo 17, with 
some blaming the lack of sustainability on the limited scope 
of the missions [2].  
Now, almost 50 years later, NASA is beginning to actively 
plan for a human Mars campaign. Recently there has been 
significant progress in efforts to evaluate different 
architectural options to enable these missions. NASA’s most 
recent plans include human visits to Mars orbit in the early 
2030s and human visits to the surface of Mars in the late 
2030s. Recent design activities, such as Design Reference 
Architecture 5.0 (DRA 5.0) [3] and particularly the 
Evolvable Mars Campaign (EMC) [4], are informing the 
planning and development of the human Mars architecture. 
As part of these activities, many of the same issues that 
were addressed in the Apollo program are also being 
evaluated in reference to a human Mars campaign. A 
primary area of interest is the content of the surface 
architecture and the level of activities conducted on Mars. 
Both recent NASA design activities, Mars DRA 5.0 and the 
EMC, focus on missions with long-duration surface stays on 
Mars, with extensive surface infrastructure to support the 
crew and to enable exploration. The decision to focus on 
long duration missions is based on a desire to maximize the 
relative “value” achieved on the missions relative to the 
expected costs and risks of executing the Mars campaign. 
Essentially the argument that is being made is, “You are 
going all the way to Mars, you should maximize what you 
do once you get there.” More specifically, if you are sending 
humans to the surface of Mars, you want to have them on 
the planet exploring for the entire duration of their stay at 
Mars.   
On the surface this appears to be a valid argument. The cost 
of a human Mars campaign will likely exceed that for any 
other previous space program. The Mars program will 
therefore receive a huge amount of public attention and 
scrutiny. By maximizing the level of achievements, the 
program is therefore more likely to be initially funded and 
to continue to receive public and political support over time. 
However, this argument oversimplifies the budgetary and 
political realities of executing a human Mars program. 
Architecting a sustainable Mars campaign is not simply a 
process of maximizing the cost-benefit ratio, but rather it 
must establish a balance between what we want to achieve 
with what we can afford to achieve.  The cost of providing 
the infrastructure required to enable long duration surface 
stays may require substantial added investments. 
Short Duration Surface Missions Versus Long Duration 
Surface Missions 
The capabilities required to deliver a crew to Mars vicinity 
and then to the surface are extensive. Supporting the crew 
for long durations on the Mars surface (typically 300-500 
days) requires a significant amount of surface infrastructure 
and a large supply of logistics. Infrastructure requirements 
include a large habitat or habitats with closed-loop 
Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS), 
a power system capable of providing power to the entire 
outpost during nighttime periods, unloading and transfer 
systems that allow cargo to be offloaded from multiple 
landers and moved to the outpost, and Extravehicular 
Activity (EVA) systems that allow the crew to operate on 
the surface. This is in addition to any other systems that are 
required to let the crew utilize their time on the surface, 
such as mobility systems to allow astronauts to explore the 
area around the outpost, science laboratories, and science 
packages. 
The alternative to a long duration mission is a much 
simpler, short duration, “sortie” type mission. In this 
approach the crew (sometimes with as few as two 
astronauts) descend to the surface and spend a limited 
amount of time exploring the site, deploying scientific 
instruments and collecting samples, before returning to the 
Deep Space Transport (DST) spacecraft in orbit around 
Mars. The proposed surface duration of the missions varies 
but is typically from 7 days to 60 days. The missions are 
characterized by the use of a minimal amount of surface 
infrastructure and logistics. Under proposed short duration 
scenarios, the crew can either live in the Mars Ascent 
Vehicle (MAV) cabin or a minimal habitat (perhaps a copy 
of the MAV cabin) with open-loop ECLSS. Power 
generation and storage capability requirements are limited, 
as the supported infrastructure and power loads are much 
lower and the missions can be designed to avoid the longest 
night durations. These short duration missions do not have 
 
Figure I.1 - Lockheed Martin Lander for 
Short Duration Surface Missions (reprinted 
with permission from Lockheed Martin) 
Figure I.2 – EMC Mars Outpost for Long 
Duration Surface Missions (build-up after 
multiple missions)
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to be copies of the very minimalistic approach employed in 
Apollo. With a limited amount of additional surface 
infrastructure (consisting of a small habitat, airlock, power 
system, and logistics storage) these missions could extend 
up to 60 days in duration and provide for a significant 
amount of exploration in that time.  
The potential advantages of the short surface duration 
mission stem primarily from the greatly reduced complexity 
of the surface architecture and operations. With less 
required capability development, less element acquisition, 
and lower required deliveries to the Mars surface, the level 
of effort for development and operations can be reduced, 
therefore reducing the potential cost and risk of the 
campaign. Illustrations of the surface elements for 
representative short surface duration and long surface 
duration are pictured in Figure I.1 [5] and Figure I.2 [6]. 
Rationale for Long Duration Surface Missions 
Recent design exercises have focused on long duration 
surface missions. For both EMC and DRA 5.0, this decision 
was made in an attempt to maximize the level of 
achievements and value accomplished during the Mars 
campaign, relative to the cost and risk. Both efforts 
reference established Mars Exploration Program Analysis 
Group (MEPAG) goals and objectives [7] (discussed further 
in Section III.E) but offer slightly different rationale for 
selecting the long duration approach. Each study also varied 
in the architectural solution selected. 
For EMC, the choice was made to focus on long-duration 
surface stays to a single outpost site, reusing capabilities on 
successive missions, conducting crewed missions on every 
other Mars departure opportunity. This choice was adopted 
based on a stated goal to promote pioneering and to expand 
human presence. The mission architects link the 
achievement of these goals to specific objectives that 
include: maximizing the time that humans spend on Mars, 
preparing to live off the land, establishing a path to 
permanent human presence, and increasing the tempo of 
capabilities and activities [8]. The decision to focus on 
build-up of capabilities at a single site was based on this 
emphasis on pioneering and on a desire to promote 
affordability and increase sustainability through the reuse of 
elements. 
For DRA 5.0, the campaign includes three long duration 
surface missions to three different locations on the Martian 
surface, conducting crewed missions on every Mars 
departure opportunity. DRA 5.0 architects performed an 
extensive analysis of Mars exploration goals and objectives 
and selected the long duration, multiple site approach as 
providing the greatest overall value, balancing both science 
achievements and expanding human presence [9]. It should 
be noted that the approach adopted in DRA 5.0, deploying a 
long duration surface infrastructure to a new location at 
every Mars opportunity, requires a very high launch rate, 
with the crewed elements for one mission being deployed at 
the same time as cargo elements for the next mission. DRA 
5.0 also requires the acquisition of extensive exploration 
hardware, potentially presenting challenges to affordability 
and sustainability. 
Single Site Versus Multiple Site 
Surface stay time is not the only discriminator in 
determining mission complexity. The other major factor is 
the number of surface sites visited during the campaign - 
whether successive missions return to the same site and 
reuse infrastructure or visit new sites on each successive 
mission. Short duration missions are insensitive to the 
number of sites visited because the surface elements are 
relatively simple and are not generally reusable.  
For long duration missions, the number of sites can be a 
major factor in complexity and cost. If missions return to the 
same site, major pieces of infrastructure such as the habitat, 
power generation, and rovers can be reused, eliminating the 
need to reacquire and redeliver those elements. This can 
reduce the complexity and cost of subsequent missions.  
Long duration missions to multiple sites are the least 
affordable option. All required infrastructure elements must 
be flown for all missions, significantly increasing the 
number of required landers, the in-space propulsion stages, 
and the number of launch vehicles. 
Short Surface Duration Versus Short-Stay Mars Missions 
It is important to distinguish between the concept of a short 
duration surface mission and a short-stay Mars mission. 
These terms are somewhat ambiguous and can result in 
some misunderstanding when comparing different solutions.  
In this paper the terms ‘short duration’ and ‘long duration’ 
are used to identify the amount of time that the crew spends 
on the surface of Mars. This parameter is independent of but 
related to another factor, which is the amount of time that 
the crew spends in Mars vicinity, whether on the surface or 
in orbit. This parameter has historically been referred to as 
the ‘Mars Stay Time’.  
Missions with a short Mars stay time, or ‘short-stay’ 
missions, utilize an opposition class trajectory for transit 
between Earth and Mars. These missions typically have a 
total in-space duration of 500-900 days, depending on the 
opportunity and the type of propulsion utilized, and a stay 
time at Mars of between 30 and 90 days. These missions are 
characterized by shorter overall mission durations and 
significantly higher delta V and thermal requirements. 
Missions with a long Mars stay time, or ‘Long-stay’ 
missions, utilize a conjunction class trajectory, where 
minimal energy transits are utilized for transfer between 
Earth and Mars. These missions typically have total 
durations of approx. 1000-1100 days with stay times 
between 350-500 days at Mars, depending on the type of 
propulsion.  
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Because of the short overall times at Mars, short-stay 
opposition class missions can only enable short duration 
surface visits. For long-stay missions, the crew can 
complete either short duration or long duration surface 
stays. If a short surface duration visit is conducted as part of 
a long-stay, conjunction class mission, the crew must spend 
the remainder of the overall Mars stay time in the DST, in 
orbit around Mars. 
Many architecture studies of short surface duration versus 
long surface duration missions concentrate on comparing 
the ‘long stay, conjunction class’ architecture with the ‘short 
stay, opposition class’ architecture, including the differences 
in propulsive requirements and total mission duration. The 
analysis presented in this paper assumes that both the short 
surface duration and the long surface duration missions 
would be conducted as part of a long-stay, conjunction class 
architecture. This assumption reflects current NASA 
planning for the in-space propulsion architecture for Mars 
missions and allows the analysis to focus on a comparison 
on differences in the surface approach, rather than 
concentrating on differences in the in-space architecture.  In 
addition, the long-stay architecture would support an 
eventual transition from short surface duration missions to 
long surface duration missions, if desired. 
2. ASSESSMENT  
In this paper, the authors identify and explore four distinct 
areas where short duration surface missions may present 
certain advantages over long duration missions. These four 
areas are: 
o Achieved Exploration Value 
o Risk Mitigation 
o Developmental Affordability 
o Operational Affordability & Flexibility 
 
This paper will compare campaign options that focus on a 
short duration, multiple site campaign to the long duration 
single site campaign that is being investigated as the 
primary option in NASA’s Evolvable Mars Campaign. Cost, 
risk, and performance data integrated from various studies 
are used to evaluate the two options and make 
recommendations for further research. 
3. ACHIEVED VALUE 
The two most recent NASA human mars mission design 
activities have focused on a long surface duration approach 
to surface exploration. In both cases the selection of a long 
duration approach was related to a desire to maximize the 
achieved value of the campaign, relative to the cost and risk.  
Campaign value is measured in relation to the achievement 
of an established set of goals and objectives. The most 
comprehensive set of goals and objectives for human Mars 
exploration was established by the MEPAG [7]. It is worth 
examining these goals and objectives in detail and 
evaluating what can be accomplished on a series of short 
duration surface mission versus long stay missions. 
MEPAG Goals and Objectives 
For both of the architecture studies rationale for the decision 
to focus on long duration architectures was related to a 
desire to maximize the value achieved by the campaign to 
the established Mars exploration goals of ‘Science’ and 
‘Expanding Human Presence’. These two sets of goals, 
which were established by the MEPAG and are detailed 
within MEPAG documentation, serve as the basis for 
informing what types of exploration activities could be 
achieved during a set of human Mars missions. 
The objectives within MEPAG Goals I-III concentrate on 
scientific discoveries at Mars. These objectives relate to the 
search for life, climate science, and geology/geophysics.  
The objectives within MEPAG Goal IV are related to 
Expanding Human Presence on Mars. These Goal IV 
objectives involve activities designed to gather knowledge 
about Mars, related to the operational environment and 
potential resources, to testing exploration systems and 
operational capabilities, and to enabling future missions.  
The time that the crews spend on the surface, the number of 
sites that they visit, the level of infrastructure deployed, and 
the reuse of infrastructure all contribute to the determination 
of how each of the MEPAG goals and objectives are 
satisfied. The rationale for why a specific architecture was 
selected for each study is similar for both DRA 5.0 and 
EMC, although the specific arguments and the architecture 
selected differ considerably. 
DRA 5.0 
As part of the DRA 5.0 effort, the analysis team conducted a 
thorough study of the sometimes competing, sometimes 
complementary goals. Evaluating the objectives and specific 
activities related to those objectives, the team evaluated four 
potential mission approaches: 
o Short Duration Single Site 
o Short Duration Multiple Site 
o Long Duration Single Site 
o Long Duration Multiple Site 
The team then separately evaluated the relative value of 
each of the four approaches in the two general areas of 
benefit: MEPAG I-III Science and MEPAG IV Expanding 
Human Presence. Results from the DRA 5.0 analysis are 
shown in Figure III.1 [9]. 
  5 
 
Figure III.1 – DRA 5.0 Goals Assessment 
In the areas of MEPAG I-III Science, the analysis team 
determined that the most productive mission type would be 
long durations at multiple sites. The team rated this as the 
“Gold” standard. Short durations at multiple sites was rated 
as the “Silver” standard and long duration, single site as 
“Bronze”. The team also determined that short duration 
single-site missions were below the acceptable standard for 
science. In their discussion the team specifically 
recommended that missions be conducted to multiple sites 
as part of a comprehensive science program and that even 
with extended mobility a single site campaign would not be 
able to satisfy all science goals. 
For MEPAG IV Expanding Human Presence, the analysis 
team determined that the long duration, single site approach 
was the “gold” standard, allowing for an expanded human 
presence and long-term testing of capabilities. The long 
duration, multiple-site was rated as “silver” and all short 
duration missions, at a single site or multiple sites as 
“bronze”. 
DRA 5.0 summarized the somewhat conflicting results of 
the two assessments as follows, “To use human explorers 
effectively in addressing these scientific questions, the first 
three human missions to Mars should be to three different 
geographic sites. The Goal IV objectives lend themselves 
best to repeated visits to a specific site on Mars, however.” 
Ultimately the team selected a long duration, multiple site 
approach as having the best balance between MEPAG goals. 
EMC 
The EMC specified return to a single-site as a ground rule 
and assumption for development of the architecture. The 
desire to reuse surface infrastructure was determined to be a 
primary goal of the campaign. In addition, EMC explicitly 
prioritized pioneering and extended human presence as a 
primary goal of the Mars campaign [8].  Based on this 
prioritization, the EMC selected a single-site, long duration 
architecture as the primary option for investigation.  
EMC options all include a build-up of infrastructure at the 
single surface location for the purpose of enabling multiple, 
successive missions. Utilizing a single surface site increases 
the efficiency of conducting long duration missions, 
allowing surface elements to be reused, with each 
successive mission adding to the infrastructure. Reuse of 
elements at a single site also facilitates the delivery of 
advanced capabilities such as ISRU propellant production 
and nuclear power, which increases the self-reliance of each 
mission, thereby reducing resupply requirements from 
Earth. The EMC enhances the conduct of Science goals at 
the single site through the extensive application of mobility 
and EVAs. 
EMC did not specifically compare the relative value of 
visiting multiple sites versus a single site, due to the single 
site ground rule. EMC did evaluate short duration single site 
options as alternatives, primarily to enhance affordability. 
These short surface stay options were limited to only the 
initial mission(s), with an immediate transition to long 
duration missions by the second or third crewed mission. 
However, EMC retained the long surface duration missions 
as the primary option for analysis. 
Achieved Value Assessment 
There is little doubt that in an environment that was not 
constrained by affordability or operability issues the ‘long 
duration, multiple site’ approach, as adopted in DRA 5.0, 
would yield the greatest possible value in relation to 
achieving MEPAG goals and objectives. However, it could 
be difficult to implement that type of architecture under 
reasonably anticipated budget and launch constraints. The 
anticipated SLS launch rate would likely not support such 
an architecture without unreasonably long periods between 
crewed missions. It is also probable that such an architecture 
would not be affordable, due the number of elements and 
launch vehicles that must be acquired to support each 
crewed mission. Similarly, the ‘short duration, single site’ 
architecture is not considered to be a reasonable alternative. 
As concluded in DRA 5.0, that option does not achieve 
satisfactory performance against either MEPAG goal area. 
Therefore it is productive to limit the discussion to either: 
o ‘Long duration, single site’ missions, or 
o ‘Short duration, multiple site’ missions 
Comparing the achieved value between these two options 
depends heavily on how different, sometimes competing, 
sometimes complimentary, goals and objectives are both 
interpreted and prioritized. 
Return on ‘Science’ Goals and Objectives—The DRA 5.0 
analysis indicates that a short duration, multiple site 
campaign provides a greater scientific return related to 
MEPAG Goals I-III than any single site approach. The 
variability of terrain and conditions on Mars virtually 
requires different landing sites in order to complete any sort 
of comprehensive scientific survey. Although most long 
duration missions anticipate extended mobility via 
pressurized rovers, the limit of these excursions will be only 
of few hundred kilometers or less. This is simply not 
enough range from a single site to capture the variability in 
Mars terrain.  Single sites will always be limited in the types 
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of terrain that astronauts can explore and collect samples 
from. In addition, the extra time available to conduct science 
offered by a long duration mission may not be as beneficial 
as anticipated. The amount of material that can be returned 
to Earth is still limited by the MAV capabilities. So, any 
additional samples collected would have to be evaluated by 
the astronauts on the surface. Based on the defined goals 
and objectives, it appears that a campaign that allows 
astronauts to visit multiple sites on the surface will provide 
greater scientific return than a campaign that visits only a 
single site. 
Return on ‘Expanding Human Presence Goals and 
Objectives’—The arguments in favor of long duration made 
for both DRA 5.0 and EMC assume that immediate build-up 
of duration and capabilities is the optimal way to complete 
the MEPAG IV objectives and to enhance human presence. 
In some ways this misstates the intent of the MEPAG goals 
and objectives as written. The MEPAG IV goal was 
intended to define exploration objectives that would 
“prepare for a sustained human presence” [7], not 
necessarily accomplish that expanded presence directly.  
While a long duration Martian outpost is undoubtedly the 
most effective mechanism to accomplish some of these 
goals, there are others, such as discovering resources that 
are better supported through visiting different sites. In 
addition, the MEPAG IV objectives specifically refer to 
“developing reliable and robust exploration systems” as an 
objective. As discussed further in the Risk Mitigation 
section of this paper, a progressive exploration campaign 
that limits initial exposure to risk and grows capabilities 
over time may be the best approach to achieving this 
objective.   
While a long duration, single site surface approach may 
maximize the value achieved in certain areas related to 
expanding human presence, there are other areas where a 
short duration, multiple site approach may equal or exceed 
the value achieved. 
4. RISK MITIGATION  
Human exploration of the Mars surface will expose the 
astronauts and architecture elements to types of risks that 
have never before been encountered. It is critical to the 
success of the campaign that these risks be addressed in a 
systematic manner that progressively exposes the missions 
and crews to these risks, characterizes the nature of the risks 
and how to mitigate them in an effective manner. 
Proponents of the long duration Mars mission often 
compare their ambitions to the achievements made in the 
field of Antarctic exploration [10]. These individuals 
foresee the ideal approach to Mars as being akin to the 
deployment of Antarctic research stations such as McMurdo 
Station on Ross Island or Amundsen-Scott Station at the 
South Pole. Both of these facilities support extended human 
occupancy in a very hostile environment, enabling science 
and exploration. However, it should be realized that these 
facilities did not come into existence during the initial 
exploration of Antarctica. Roald Amundsen first reached the 
South Pole in 1911 after an 18-month journey, as illustrated 
in Figure IV.1. He and his crew stayed only a few days at 
the South Pole. Subsequent expeditions to the Antarctic 
progressively improved knowledge about the environment. 
Amundsen-Scott station was not established until 1956, 45 
years after the initial visit, illustrated in Figure IV.2.  
The Antarctic experience actually demonstrates a more 
measured, more realistic approach to exploration. Because 
of the severity of the environment and the inherent risks, it 
would have been logistically, financially, and politically 
difficult to immediately establish any sort of semi-
permanent base at the South Pole. Rather, explorers spent 45 
years exploring the Antarctic environment. Only then were 
they able to transition to a near-permanent presence. 
This is an approach that applies directly to the exploration 
of Mars. Despite the numerous robotic missions that have 
been conducted in orbit and to the surface, our knowledge of 
conditions and threats on the Mars surface and how they 
will impact human missions is extremely limited. As such, 
there are a number of significant risks to the Mars surface 
 
Figure IV.1 – 1st Amundsen South Pole Expedition Figure IV.2 – Amundsen-Scott Research Station 
(Credit Amundsen, Roald: The South Pole, Vol. II, first (Credit Scot Jackson, National Science Foundation) 
published by John Murray, London 1913. Photo facing 
page 134) 
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mission and Mars astronauts.   
Safety Risk on the Martian Surface  
Surface risks are extensively described in the National 
Research Council Report “Safe on Mars” [11]. These risks 
include:  
Chemical Environmental Hazards on Systems—The impact 
of soil and airborne dust and perchlorates on the safe 
operation of critical systems is a major threat to the mission 
and the crew [12]. Degradation of equipment, including 
corrosion, could lead to critical impairment of life support 
or transportation functionality. The more complex the 
surface systems are, and the longer those systems are 
exposed, the greater the risk posed to the mission and the 
crew. This is particularly significant for architectures such 
as those presented in the EMC, where surface infrastructure 
is planned for reuse on multiple successive missions. In that 
case, elements such as the surface habitat and fission power 
units are to be used for up to 15 years.  
Surface impacts on the MAV are of particular concern. The 
MAV is a critical element to crew safety. The longer the 
MAV is on the surface, the greater the exposure to surface 
conditions and the greater the risk. In the proposed EMC 
architecture, the MAV is on the surface for nearly two years 
prior to ascent due to the length of the surface mission and 
the need to generate ISRU propellant prior to crew arrival. 
Chemical Environmental Hazards on Crew—The presence 
of toxic constituents, including perchlorates, in soil and 
airborne dust could present a risk to the crew [12]. The 
presence of these toxins and their impact on the crew has 
not been adequately defined and may not be prior to the first 
human missions. Longer duration missions result in greater 
exposure to the crew. 
Hazards from Atmospheric Dynamics—Although 
atmospheric electrical activity on Mars has not been 
observed to the same degree as lightning generated by 
charged ice particles on Earth, there is evidence that 
electrical activity can be generated by Martian dust storms 
and dust devils. A potentially greater risk to crew and 
system safety is the lack of local electrical ground on Mars 
which significantly increases the potential for electrostatic 
discharge, specifically during EVA/Rover operations that 
can result in charge buildup due to surface friction. The 
severity and potential impacts of atmospheric dynamics on 
exploration systems from electrostatic discharge has not 
been fully investigated.   
Physical Environmental Hazards—Despite experience with 
robotic landers, there is still uncertainty in the physical 
makeup of the Martian surface and the variability of that 
makeup. There are hazards related to the physical 
interaction of exploration infrastructure with surface, 
including tip-over, abrasion, and impact, particularly in 
complex terrain environments where the impact of surface 
winds are less understood. More complex architectures, 
which require unloading of elements from landers, 
transportation across the surface, and integration are 
significantly more susceptible to these hazards. 
An initial long-stay mission would result in full exposure to 
each of these risks with limited opportunities to better 
understand the nature of the risks and potential mitigation 
solutions prior to the crewed mission. Initial short duration 
missions present a significantly more conservative approach 
to mitigating these surface risks. Short duration missions 
with minimal infrastructure would result in less exposure to 
each of the risks and the conduct of those missions would 
allow for an evaluation of the surface impacts on systems 
with lower initial durations of exposure and/or lower 
criticality. This knowledge can then be used to improve the 
performance and safety of future systems. 
Other Mars Surface Risks 
In addition to the risks described above there are other 
evaluations and surveys that, while they may or may not 
directly impact the safety of initial missions, could be 
important to complete before selecting a site for a 
permanent Mars outpost. A key element to eventually 
making long duration surface stays sustainable is lessening 
the need for resupply from Earth. This means that local 
production of logistics, such as propellant, gas, water, and 
food, must be explored and the resources and processes 
required to enable must be established. 
Availability of Resources—Water and other resources, 
extracted from Martian atmosphere and regolith for the 
production of power and propulsion consumables, will be 
important in allowing a Mars outpost to reduce dependence 
on Earth and expand human presence. Selecting a site with 
abundant available resources will be critical. Exploration of 
multiple sites in different geographical and geological areas 
will allow for a better understanding of resource availability 
prior to selecting an outpost site [9].  
Demonstration of Resource Processing—Demonstrating the 
capability to collect and process in-situ resources will also 
be critical. ISRU systems will be complex and have to 
operate for long-periods in a hostile environment. It will be 
desirable to improve the operability and reliability of these 
types of systems, prior to putting them in the critical path 
for supporting the crew of producing propellant for the 
MAV. ISRU demonstration activities will be completed as 
part of the Mars 2020 Mars Oxygen ISRU Experiment 
(MOXIE). Additional demonstrations could be completed as 
part of short duration missions. 
Alternate Risks of Short Duration Surface Missions 
Proponents of the long duration mission point out that there 
are other threats where the risk of the short duration mission 
could be greater than for the long duration. Typically, a 
discussion of the following risks is used as a justification for 
the long duration surface missions.  
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In-Space Health Risk to Crew—If, as assumed in the 
analysis presented in this paper, that short surface duration 
missions are conducted as part of a long-stay conjunction 
class mission, then the crew would have to spend the 
remainder (the time not spent on the surface) of the Mars 
vicinity time in the spacecraft in orbit around Mars. This 
increases the total exposure to known risks to crew health 
from radiation and microgravity.  
While the risks to the crew in space are significant, the total 
time spent in space for the short duration is only moderately 
longer than for the long duration. For the proposed EMC 
architecture, with a 350-day stay in Mars vicinity, the crew 
on a long duration would spend approximately 875 days in 
space. For the short surface duration mission, assuming a 
30-day surface stay, the crew would spend about 1,170 days 
in space, an increase of approximately 33%.  
In addition, the risk associated with long in-space durations 
is an area NASA must address in order to proceed with the 
current exploration plan. The planned initial 2033 orbital 
mission will keep the crew in space for the entire 1100 day 
Orbital mission. The risk of a short duration mission will be 
no greater than for that mission. In addition, even if NASA 
decides not to proceed with an orbital mission, the crew 
must still be able to spend the entire Mars vicinity duration 
in space. There is always the chance that the crew may be 
unable to descend to the surface or will need to abort to 
orbit from the surface due to a technical failure or other 
hazard. Additional research is required to determine the 
magnitude of risk to human health of long durations in 
space and whether NASA will be able to sufficiently 
mitigate those risks to enable missions of different 
durations.  
Crew Acclimatization—One major issue with short surface 
stay missions is the amount of time that the crew will be 
able to dedicate to exploration versus simply acclimating to 
the Mars surface environment. After a nearly one year 
journey from Earth to Mars, the crew will have some level 
of deconditioning due to the micro-gravity in-space 
environment. There will be some period required for the 
crew to gain functionality in the Mars gravity environment 
(even at 1/6 g). If this period is extensive, it could 
significantly reduce the productivity of a short stay mission. 
In addition, if the crew tries to do too much on the surface 
prior to acclimatization, there is a risk of injury and negative 
health impact. 
Increased Criticality of Surface Elements—One advantage 
of an extensive surface architecture is that it provides 
redundancy and increased safety for the crew. If there is a 
failure in habitation capabilities, the crew can shelter in 
other elements on the surface until the problem is resolved 
or until they can abort. Similarly, if there are issues with the 
MAV, the crew can shelter for extensive periods on the 
surface until the issues are resolved. 
There is currently no definitive answer as to what type of 
mission, short surface stay or long surface stay, would result 
in the greatest risk to the crew or to how those risks can be 
reduced. As NASA proceeds with architecting the Mars 
mission it will be important to conduct further research and 
a quantitative risk assessment to understand and compare 
these risks. However, there is a possibility that the less 
complex infrastructure and shorter exposure times offered 
by the short surface stay mission could reduce overall risk. 
5. DEVELOPMENTAL AFFORDABILITY 
The most significant potential advantage of conducting 
initial short duration missions to Mars is in the area of 
affordability. A human Mars campaign will be one of the 
most challenging, and most expensive, activities ever 
attempted. It is vital that an approach be selected that allows 
costs to be controlled and spread out in a way that makes the 
undertaking affordable. It is unlikely that NASA will 
receive a substantial increase in budget, or any increase at 
all, to support the human Mars campaign. It is therefore 
critical that activities are structured in such a way that the 
associated costs can be spread out to maintain a reasonable 
budget. Even with new acquisition methods and 
international partner participation it is likely that 
affordability will remain challenging. 
Any human mission to Mars will require the development of 
a new and complex set of capabilities. Required capabilities 
include crew and cargo launch systems, an in-space 
habitation system to safely carry the crew to and from Mars, 
a propulsion system(s) to transport the crew and cargo, 
ECLSS to keep the crew alive, communication systems to 
reach back to Earth, and EVA systems to allow the crew to 
operate out of the spacecraft.  
Reaching the surface requires an additional set of 
capabilities. An entry, descent, and landing (EDL) system 
capable of delivering 10s of metric tons of cargo to the 
surface with a high level of accuracy and safety is required 
to support a human mission. An ascent vehicle that can be 
delivered on that lander and which can be launched from the 
surface to return the crew safely to the DST is also 
necessary. Finally, any capabilities that are required for the 
Table V.1 – DDT&E Cost Estimates for Human Mars Mission Architecture, By Phase, Corrected to 
FY2017 Dollars – Price et al (2009) 
In-Space Transportation Surface Access and Ascent Surface Infrastructure 
Capability FY17 Cost Capability FY17 Cost Capability FY17 Cost 
In-Space Propulsion $4.62B Descent/Ascent Vehicle $17.44B Surface Habitat $8.09B 
Deep Space Habitat $6.33B   Power/Logistics $6.50B 
Total $10.94B Total $17.44B Total $14.59B 
 
  9 
crew to live and operate on the surface must also be 
developed. 
NASA’s current approach to achieving affordability in the 
Mars campaign is based on a successive increase in the 
goals of the program and in the capabilities that must be 
developed to achieve those goals. The current exploration 
plan envisions a staged approach to Mars exploration. 
Initially, the technologies, capabilities, and knowledge 
required for human deep space missions will be developed 
on Earth, at the ISS, and in cis-lunar space. Next, the 
transportation and in-space habitation capabilities required 
for the Mars mission will be developed and tested, 
culminating with a human Mars orbital mission in the early 
2030s. Then, the capabilities required for the surface 
mission will be developed, with the goal of landing humans 
on the surface in the late 2030s. 
The content of each of the stages must be carefully managed 
to limit required capability development and cost. In Price et 
al (2009) [13], the Aerospace Corporation completed a set 
of cost estimates for the development of required Mars 
exploration elements. While actual costs will depend upon a 
number of factors, including specific technologies and 
architecture, acquisition method, and partnerships, these 
costs can serve as a measure of the relative level of effort 
(LOE) required to develop different capabilities. The costs 
used in this paper generally agree with those described by 
the National Research Council (2014) [14,15]. Estimated 
DDT&E costs, segregated by stage, are summarized in 
Table V.1. 
Price et al. estimate the cost for DDT&E of the in-space 
transportation system, including the deep space habitat and 
the in-space propulsion stages, to be FY17$10.9B (corrected 
from FY2009 dollars), as shown in Table V.1. 
Developments for this stage would also include ECLSS, 
EVA, medical, autonomy, and other required investments.  
Costs for the development of capabilities to enable a short 
duration surface mission are dominated by the cost of the 
Mars Lander and Mars Ascent Vehicle. Other required 
capabilities would include surface EVA and potentially 
mobility systems. Developmental costs for aerobraking and 
aerocapture are also included in this phase, if applicable. It 
is assumed that short duration missions do not require the 
development of extensive surface habitation capabilities. 
Crew can either live in the MAV cabin or a minimal habitat 
(perhaps a copy of the MAV cabin) and open-loop ECLSS 
can be utilized. Power generation and storage capabilities 
are also limited. Price et al estimate the cost of these 
capabilities to be FY17$17.4B. 
The capabilities required to then enable a long duration 
surface mission are substantial. These capabilities include: a 
long duration habitat, with closed-loop ECLSS and 
extensive environmental monitoring, mobility, lander 
offloading and cargo transport, and logistics delivery 
systems. In addition, a power generation and storage system 
capable of supporting the outpost, including nighttime 
periods, is required. Price et al estimate the total cost of 
these capabilities to be FY17$14.6B.  
The cost estimate for the extended surface infrastructure is 
likely conservative. Price at al assumed a radioisotope 
power system, as opposed to a fission surface power system 
(FSPS), which is anticipated in both DRA 5.0 and the EMC. 
FSPS will likely have a significantly higher cost to develop. 
In addition, the development of a surface outpost also 
imposes additional requirements on the architecture, which 
will inevitably increase those costs as well. Capabilities 
such as pressurized rovers, unloading systems, and science 
labs were not included in the estimates made by Price et al.  
If a progressive approach to Mars surface missions is 
pursued, with some period of short duration missions 
preceding any long duration activities, a cost profile can be 
achieved that is evenly loaded and therefore more likely to 
be sustainable. In NASA’s anticipated exploration timeline, 
the bulk of the FY17$10.9B of development cost for the in-
space transportation capabilities would be expended in the 
seven year period between 2019 and 2026, supporting the 
anticipated launch of the DST in 2027 and the crewed Mars 
orbital mission starting in 2033. This represents an average 
annual base DDT&E expenditure of FY17$1.6B.  
The FY17$17.4B for the development of the surface access 
and ascent would then be expended in the seven year period 
between 2026 and 2033. The first lander elements would be 
launched in the mid-2030 timeframe to support the 2037 
surface mission. This represents an average DDT&E cost 
over the development period of FY17$2.5B per year. 
In order to achieve a more sustainable profile it is highly 
desirable to defer the development of the long duration 
surface capabilities until after the development of the short 
duration capabilities. In this scenario, the development of 
long duration capabilities would be deferred by a minimum 
of seven years, not starting until after 2033. Doing so would 
avoid overlaps between the DDT&E for surface access and 
long duration and reduce funding peaks. Such a schedule 
would allow for a transition to long duration missions, if 
desired, for the 2043 or 2045 departure opportunities. If 
development of long duration capabilities are deferred, with 
no overlap with the short duration development, then the 
FY17$14.6B would be expended over a seven-year period 
beginning sometime after 2033. The average annual 
DDT&E expenditure in this period would be FY17$2.1B. 
However, if long duration missions are selected as the initial 
approach to human exploration of the Mars surface, then the 
full set of surface access and long duration surface 
infrastructure capabilities must be developed essentially 
simultaneously in the period between 2026 and 2033. The 
total DDT&E cost of the minimal set of capabilities to 
enable long duration surface mission is FY17$32.0B. This 
would result in an average annual base DDT&E expenditure 
of FY17$4.6B over this period. This amount represents a 
large spike in projected DDT&E spending and is likely to be 
unaffordable under any projected budget profile, even ones 
that include a moderate increase in NASA funding.  
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Cost is not the only factor that is related to the DDT&E 
effort. There is also programmatic risk associated with any 
new capability development. Any time that a new critical 
path capability is added to the system, the risk of delay 
and/or cost overrun increases. Adding the long surface stay 
capabilities, in addition to the short surface stay, to the set of 
developments that must occur to enable the first human 
surface mission will increase the probability of 
programmatic delay. 
The potential for short duration surface missions to allow 
for a more affordable campaign is a point that is emphasized 
in Lockheed Martin’s Mars Base Camp architectural 
proposal. Lockheed Martin emphasizes that short surface 
stay missions are not just “flags and footprints” but rather 
enable the exploration of Mars on a near-term timescale 
providing a realistic, achievable architecture in the 2030s 
[5]. 
6. OPERATIONAL COST & FLEXIBILITY 
Capability development costs represents just a portion of the 
total resources dedicated to the human Mars campaign. 
Operational costs are also a significant contributor to the 
overall budget. Operational costs are particularly significant 
because they are not one-time costs, as with DDT&E, but 
rather are recurring over the length of the program. For this 
reason operational costs directly impact the sustainability of 
the program.   
The number of landers required to support each crewed 
mission is a primary discriminator between short duration 
and long duration missions. Additional landers must not 
only be acquired but also require additional in-space 
propulsion elements to deliver them to Mars, additional 
propellant, and additional launch vehicles. 
As part of the EMC analysis, Goodliff et al (2016) [16] 
evaluated the number of landers required to enable a series 
of short duration and a series of long duration missions to 
the Martian surface, as seen in Figure VI.1. A number of 
different architectural solutions were evaluated in EMC with 
landers ranging in capacity from 18t to 27t cargo delivered 
to the Mars surface.  
In the analysis presented by Goodliff et al, the long 
duration, single site mission requires four 20t landers (with 
LOX-Methane engines) to enable the initial human surface 
mission and 3 landers for each following mission. Although 
it should be noted that additional landers would eventually 
be required over time, as elements need to be replaced. Each 
lander requires an in-space propulsion stage, propellant, and 
SLS launch vehicles to launch the elements into space. The 
net result is that the initial long duration mission requires 14 
SLS launches to complete the mission, with three crewed 
launches and 11 cargo launches. Each subsequent crew 
mission requires either 8 or 9 SLS launches to complete, 
with three crewed launches and either five or six cargo 
launches. The number of launches for subsequent missions 
varies because of the accumulation of propellant to refuel 
the in-space stages. The number of required SLS is reduced 
for subsequent missions because of the lower number of 
landers and because in-space propulsion stages are reused in 
the EMC architecture. 
For a short duration mission, Goodliff et al estimate that two 
24t landers (with storable propellant engines) would be 
required. This is likely a conservative estimate. Other 
architectures have presented solutions that utilize a single 
lander of similar capacity to enable short duration missions. 
However, these architectures typically involve other in-
space capabilities to supplement the lander/ascent stage 
capabilities. Price et al (2016) [17] utilized a single 28t 
 
Figure VI.1 – Elements Required for Long Duration and Short Duration Surface Missions 
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lander to enable short duration missions. However, this 
architecture also relied on a taxi vehicle to return the crew 
from low Mars orbit to the DST. As part of their Base Camp 
architecture [5] Lockheed Martin has proposed the use of a 
single lander that relies on refueling in Mars orbit. For the 
purposes of this comparison, two landers are assumed for 
the short duration mission. 
Under these assumptions, the initial short duration mission 
requires a total of 10 SLS launches, with 3 crewed and 
seven cargo SLS launches. Each additional short duration 
mission requires a total of seven SLS launches, three crewed 
and four cargo. Again, the reduction in the SLS requirement 
is due to the reuse of in-space stages. 
The difference in SLS launches between the short duration 
and long duration missions is particularly significant to the 
long-term sustainability of the Mars campaign. NASA 
projects that it has the capability to launch an average of two 
SLS per year, with a goal that at least one be a crewed 
launch. The current assumption is that a human mission to 
Mars would be conducted at every other Mars orbital 
departure opportunity, or approximately every 51 months.  
Conducting a mission at every opportunity would be too 
much of a strain on resources. Conducting missions less 
frequently would create large gaps in the program. 
With a 51-month launch period, equating to the 51 months 
between crewed missions, there is an opportunity for 
approximately 8 SLS launches, four of which would be 
crewed and four cargo launches. The long duration mission 
requirement for 14 initial launches and 8 or 9 subsequent 
launches for each mission will stress the established SLS 
average flight rate. For the initial mission, launches will 
have to spread out over a number of years prior to the 
crewed surface mission. Since the orbital mission will also 
be conducted during this timeframe, the stress on SLS 
launches becomes even more severe. NASA currently 
anticipates having to launch the first SLS to support the 
2037 crewed mission as early as 2034. Assets launched on 
these initial flights will have to loiter in space for very long 
periods of time prior to the crew launch. In addition, these 
early launches will also accelerate the development and 
acquisition of the cargo elements manifested on these 
flights. 
Follow-on long duration missions will also stress the SLS 
launch rate. Launching five or six cargo missions in the 51-
month launch period will require either additional SLS 
launches and/or will require that some planned crew 
missions be converted to cargo missions. 
In contrast, the short duration missions can more easily be 
accommodated under the projected SLS launch constraints. 
With only three crew and four cargo launches required, the 
launch campaign can be completed in the 51 month period 
with one additional SLS available to use for other missions. 
The number of landers, stages, and launch vehicles required 
also directly impacts the on-going operational costs of the 
Mars campaign. Acquiring the additional elements required 
to enable long-term missions will add significantly to the 
operational costs for the Mars program. 
Flexibility in on-going operations is another potential 
advantage of the short duration, multiple site surface 
approach. Rather than being tied to a fixed outpost with 
large logistics demands, the short duration architecture can 
be re-planned and redirected over time. Lockheed Martin 
emphasizes this conclusion in their Mars Base camp 
architecture, noting that mission locations and operations 
can be tailored as new discoveries are made and as 
resources and areas of interest are identified. 
In addition, in order to achieve the goals of pioneering and 
expanded human presence, the proposed long duration 
campaigns anticipate continued missions over an indefinite 
period. In effect, NASA could be “locked into” supporting 
these missions for a considerable period of time, largely 
eliminating the opportunity to pursue other exploration 
activities. A possible advantage of the short duration 
approach is that the specific goals of this phase can be 
achieved within an established timeframe, allowing NASA 
to move onto the next phase in exploration once completed. 
7. INITIAL SHORT DURATION MISSIONS 
The selection of surface mission architecture does not have 
to be a binary choice between short duration and long 
duration surface missions. There is a continuum of surface 
architectures with differing durations and capabilities that 
exist between the very short, Apollo-type missions and the 
full duration, full outpost type missions. Capabilities can be 
added and durations extended at one or multiple sites as 
budget and risk mitigation allows.  
In addition, if pioneering-type goals continue to be 
important to NASA, it is always possible to transition from 
short duration to long duration surface missions at any point 
in the future. In the assumed approach, there is nothing 
about either the in-space architecture or the lander/ascent 
architecture that is unique to either mission. Once the 
capabilities to deliver the crew to Mars have been 
developed, the operational risks are reduced, sites are 
surveyed, and the hardware is proven, there is always an 
opportunity to transition to long-duration missions, if 
desired. As discussed in Section V, deferring long surface 
duration capabilities produces a budget profile that is more 
affordable and more sustainable. In addition, this approach 
also allows NASA to select an outpost site that has proven 
resources and is of particular scientific interest. Finally, a 
progressive development of surface capabilities could 
significantly reduce operational risk as the surface 
conditions and the impact on exploration systems are better 
defined.  
 8. SUMMARY  
A significant topic of concern among the mission architects, 
decision-makers, space enthusiasts, and other stakeholders 
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in human Mars exploration, relates to the sustainability of 
the Mars campaign. For many of these stakeholders, the 
desire to conduct an infrastructure rich Mars campaign, 
including a ‘Mars Outpost’ and near-permanent human 
occupancy stems, at least in part, from the Apollo 
experience.  
The argument that is advanced is that a repeat of the Apollo 
approach, pejoratively referred to as ‘Flags and Footprints’ 
does not provide adequate (or at least optimal) return on 
investment, will not result in a sufficient level of support 
from the public and from Congress, and that ultimately will 
lead to a dead-end in human Mars exploration. 
This argument, however, assumes that it was the content of 
the Apollo missions that most directly contributed to the 
cancellation of the program; that, ultimately, the apparent 
value of the program did not justify further continued 
expenditures. However, this argument greatly oversimplifies 
why the Apollo program ended. While there was 
undoubtedly a decrease in the level of immediate public 
attention as the program progressed, that decrease is relative 
to the massive level of interest in the Apollo 11 mission. 
The public was still avidly watching each and every 
mission.  
Similarly, the described lack of content in Apollo missions 
is also misleading. During the 600 total man-hours that 
astronauts spent on the Moon they explored six geologically 
different areas, collected and returned nearly 400kg of 
samples, conducted 160 hours of crew-EVAs, deployed 26 
science packages, and drove 90km across the surface [18]. 
Data and samples from the missions are still being evaluated 
today, 45 years after the missions [19]. 
Rather, the primary driver in the cancellation of Apollo was 
the huge cost of ongoing operations. Even after DDT&E 
was complete, the average annual ongoing operational cost 
of Apollo from 1969 to 1971 was approximately $1.54B per 
year in 1970 ($9.72B in 2017 dollars), to conduct an 
average of 1.5 missions per year [20]. This represented 52% 
of the total NASA budget over that period. This was simply 
not a sustainable level of spending. Other priorities for 
NASA and for the nation would not allow for this continued 
level of investment, no matter what was being accomplished 
on the lunar surface. 
This presents a valuable lesson for Mars exploration.  
Controlling costs is a paramount factor in sustaining a 
program. Continued human exploration of Mars, if desired, 
can only be achieved through a program that has an 
affordable, sustainable budget profile. Achieving such a 
profile will likely require a carefully crafted, progressive 
approach to developing and deploying new capabilities. It is 
likely that NASA, even with help from international 
partners, will not be able to simultaneously develop and 
deploy all of the capabilities to deliver humans to the 
Martian surface AND the capabilities to survive on the 
surface for a year at a time. 
In addition, the risk of Mars exploration is substantial and 
must be addressed in a progressive manner.  
There should be no realistic fear that any human Mars 
program will suffer from a lack of public interest.  Overall 
interest in all space activities and Mars activities are 
extremely high. There are now more ways for the public to 
follow and interact with missions than ever before, 
including social media and interactive VR technology that 
foster public participation in a Mars exploration experience. 
There is no lack of public interest in the ISS and Mars 
robotic programs. Surveys continually show a very high 
level of interest in space and in Mars missions in particular.  
This is a case in which the over ambitious program is less 
likely to be sustained (or to ever be executed in the first 
place). Only by scaling our ambitions can we achieve an 
affordable and sustainable exploration program. As NASA 
moves forward in evaluating the architectural trade space 
for human Mars missions, it will be critical to include the 
analysis of short duration missions, which could result in 
satisfaction of most of the established goals and objectives, 
could reduce mission and crew risk, and may present the 
only affordable solution in the near-term. 
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